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An  Ethics  Of  Discomfort:  Supplementing  Ricœur  On  Translation  
Lisa  Foran  
School of Philosophy, University College Dublin 
Abstract: 
This   article   compares  Paul  Ricœur   and   Jacques  Derrida   on   the   theme  of   translation   and   in  particular   the  
ethical   implications   of   the   different   ways   in   which   they   approach   the   untranslatable.      While   Ricœur’s  
account  of  translation  as  linguistic  hospitality  does  offer  a  model  for  an  ethical  encounter  with  the  other,  I  
argue   that   this  account  does  not  go   far  enough.  My  central  claim  is   that  Ricœur’s   treatment  of   translation  
overemphasizes   the  movement   of   appropriation   and   integration.  While   it   may   not   be   his   intention,   this  
emphasis  could  lead  to  a  certain  kind  of  complacency  that  would  challenge  the  ethical  claims  Ricœur  makes  
in   favour   of   translation   as   a   paradigm.   I   propose   to   supplement   Ricœur’s   hospitality   with   Derrida’s  
untranslatable,   in   order   to   create   a   situation   of   constant   discomfort   thereby   guarding   against   ethical  
complacency.  
Keywords:  Ricœur,  Derrida,  Translation,  Ethics.  
Résumé: 
Cet   article   compare   les   approches   que   Ricœur   et   Derida   font   du   thème   de   la   traduction   en   abordant   en  
particulier  les  implications  éthiques  de  leurs  manières  différentes  d’aborder  la  question  de  l’intraduisible.  Si  
le   traitement   ricœurien   du   problème   de   la   traduction   en   termes   d’hospitalité   langagière   offre   le   modèle  
d’une   rencontre   éthique   de   l’autre,   je   soutiens   que   cette   approche   ne   va   pas   assez   loin.   Mon   argument  
central  est  que,  dans  son   traitement  de   la   traduction,  Ricœur  met  exagérément   l’accent  sur   le  mouvement  
d’appropriation   et   d’intégration.   Même   si   cette   emphase   n’est   peut-­‐‑être   pas   intentionnelle,   elle   pourrait  
conduire   à   une   certaine   suffisance   susceptible   de   remettre   en   question   le   pladoyer   éthique  de  Ricœur   en  
faveur   de   la   traduction   comme   paradigme.   Je   propose   en   ce   sens   d’ajouter   à   l’hospitalité   ricœurienne  
l’intraduisible   derridien,   afin   de   créer   une   situation   de   constant   inconfort   nous   préservant   de   toute  
suffisance  éthique.  
Mot-­‐‑clés:  Ricœur,  Derrida,  traduction,  éthique.  
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Introduction  
Paul  Ricœur  was  a  gifted  translator.  His  translation  of  Edmund  Husserl’s  Ideas,  published  
in  1950,  played  a  significant  role  in  introducing  phenomenology  to  the  French  cultural  scene.  One  
could  even  claim,  as  Richard  Kearney  does,  that  as  a  mediator  between  philosophical  traditions,  
Ricœur   in   fact  practises  philosophy  as   translation.1   In   this  article,  however,   I  will   focus  only  on  
those  texts  by  Ricœur  that  deal  explicitly  with  translation.  
I  begin  by  examining  Ricœur’s  first  thematic  treatment  of  translation  where  he  proposes  
translation  as  one  of  “three  models  of  integration”  for  Europe.  I  then  examine  Jacques  Derrida’s  
reading   of   Shakespeare’s   The  Merchant   of   Venice   which   brings   together   various   themes   of   this  
article  such  as  the  untranslatable,  forgiveness,  and  theological-­‐‑political  translation.  Returning  to  
Ricœur   in  part   three,   I  discuss  his  account  of   the   trial  of   the   foreign,  arguing   that   the  views  on  
appropriation,  which  he  shares  with  the  German  translators  of  the  late  eighteenth  century,  are  in  
tension  with  certain  aspects  of  his  ethics.   I  also  suggest   that,  unlike  Derrida,  he  finds  no  ethical  
value  in  the  untranslatable.  Finally,  I  examine  the  relation  between  mourning  and  hospitality  in  
both  Ricœur  and  Derrida.  Overall  my  argument  is  that,  while  Ricœur’s  account  of  translation  as  a  
model   of   hospitality   has  much   to   recommend   it,   and   indeed  much   in   common  with  Derrida’s  
account,   it   ultimately   runs   the   risk  of  putting   everyone  on   the   same   level.  Ricœur’s   account  of  
ethical  hospitality  is  “happy”  and  pragmatic  rather  than  uncomfortable  and  impossible.  My  claim  
is   that   his  model   of   translation   therefore   (although  perhaps  unintentionally)   levels   the   playing  
field   of   exchange   and   does   not   sufficiently   guard   against   complacency.   Derrida,   on   the   other  
hand,  by  holding  on  to  the  untranslatable  as  the  model  of  exchange,  keeps  us  on  the  knife  edge  of  
discomfort.  For  Derrida  we  are  not  all  on  the  same  level  where  we  can  all  be  equally  understood.  
Rather   at   the   heart   of   Derrida’s   account   is   an   insurmountable   difference   that   prevents   a  
comfortable  settling  into  sameness.  It  is  this  discomfort,  I  argue,  that  is  precisely  what  is  needed  if  
the  European  project  is  to  be  a  truly  ethical  one.  
1.  Three  Models  of  Integration  
The  first  text  to  be  examined  in  Ricœur’s  thematic  writings  on  translation  is  a  short  essay  
from   1992,   “Quel   ethos   nouveau   pour   l’Europe?”2   It   is   significant   that   this   first   treatment   of  
translation   occurs   within   the   context   of   reimagining   a   “post-­‐‑national   state”   for   Europe   and  
reflecting   on   the   ethical-­‐‑political   necessities   of   such   an   imagining.   It   is   also   significant   that   the  
essay   is   published   in   the   same   year   as   the   signing   of   the   Maastricht   Treaty   which   formally  
integrated   and   inaugurated   the   European   Union   of   (at   the   time)   twelve   countries   in   ten  
languages.   Ricœur’s   question   in   this   essay   is   how   to   include   the   ethical,   spiritual,   intellectual,  
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religious   and   cultural   concerns   of   various   groups   in   the   imagining   and   realization   of   new  
political  and  juridical  institutions.3  Including  such  concerns  is  not  only  desirable  but  necessary  for  
the  real   implementation,  at   the   formal   level,  of   such  new  institutions.  “Taken  as  a  whole   it   is  a  
matter  of  combining  ‘identity’  and  ‘alterity’  at  numerous  levels  that  will  need  to  be  distinguished.  
What  we  most  desperately  lack  are  models  of  integration  between  these  two  poles.”4  My  claim  in  
this  article  is  that  it  is  this  desire  for  combining  and  integrating  that  threatens  the  type  of  ethical  
claims  that  Ricœur  wants  to  make,  that  in  fact  the  ethical  relation  to  the  Other  [autrui]  demands  
not  a  desire  to  integrate  her,  but  a  willingness  to  live  with  the  uncomfortable  fact  of  the  Other’s  
ability  to  transcend  one’s  comprehension.  It  is  about  respecting  that  which  cannot  be  integrated,  
assimilated   or   made   one’s   own.   My   claim   is   that   the   test   [l’épreuve]   of   the   Other   is   non-­‐‑
assimilation.   That   which   cannot   be   assimilated   is,   I   argue   following   Jacques   Derrida,   the  
untranslatable   in   every   other.   Before   setting   out   my   claim   I   will   briefly   summarise   this   first  
treatment   of   translation   by   Ricœur   and   specifically   the   three   “models   of   integration”   that   he  
proposes.  
The   first   model   is   that   of   translation   from   one   language   to   another.   Here   Ricœur  
describes   translation   as   the   enactment   of   the   law  of   a  universal   translatability.   In   other  words,  
everything  can  in  principle,  in  theory,  by  law,  be  translated.  Languages  or  texts  that  have  resisted  
translation   thus   far,   such   as   Cretan   hieroglyphs   and   the   Linear   A   script,   are   simply   awaiting  
translation  as  opposed  to  being  untranslatable.  To  paraphrase  Bernhard  Waldenfels,  there  is  only  
an  untranslatable  de   facto   and  not  de   jure.5   The  practice   of   translation,   for  Ricœur,   requires   two  
ingredients   –   a   flesh   and   blood   bilingual   mediator   and   their   corresponding   commitment   to   a  
search   for   “optimum   commensurability”   between   languages.6   This   second   ingredient   will   be  
renamed   in   a   slightly   later   Ricœur   text   the   “construction   of   comparables.”7   The   model   of  
translation   follows   that   of   von  Humboldt   and   involves   “raising   the   distinctive   spirit”   of   one’s  
own  language  to  that  of  the  foreign  language;  it  involves  “living  with  the  other  in  order  to  take  
that  other  to  one’s  home  as  a  guest.”8  Such  a  model  of  linguistic  hospitality  seems  appropriate  to  
the  particular  problem  of  how  to  construct  a  new  Europe.  Practically  speaking,  it  would  serve  to  
motivate  a  multilingual  education.  On  what  Ricœur  terms  a  more  “spiritual  level,”  this  model  of  
translation  would  encourage  cultural  bi-­‐‑  or  poly-­‐‑lingualism,  thus  welcoming  not  only  the  other’s  
language  but  also  the  other’s  culture.  
For  the  moment,  I  simply  want  to  emphasise  that  this  model  of  translation,  one  of  three  
models  of  integration,  is  about  taking  the  other  home.  This  movement  of  appropriation,  even  if  it  is  
the  taking  home  of  the  other  as  guest  and  not  as  captive  (as  it  is  in  St.  Jerome)  presupposes  three  
things.  Firstly,  it  takes  as  its  starting  point  here,  me  and  what  is  my  own  as  against  what  is  other.  
Secondly,  it  assumes  that  it  is  this  starting  point  that  is  to  be  enriched  by  the  encounter.  Thirdly,  it  
has  a  corresponding  disregard  for  the  other  as  radical  other.  Given  Ricœur’s  stated  opposition  to  
the   idea  of   a   self-­‐‑same   identity  and  his  argument   for   the   idea  of  a   self   that   is  plural,   emerging  
over   time   through   its   encounter  with  multiple   others,   his   emphasis   on   appropriation   in   these  
writings   on   translation   seems   at   best   incongruent.   His   account   of   the   identity   of   the   self   as   a  
pluralistic  knot  of  narratives   surely   entails   equal  measures  of   expropriation  and  appropriation;  
and  yet,  he  fails  to  explicitly  make  this  claim  when  writing  on  translation.  
The  subsequent  two  models  –  the  model  of  the  exchange  of  memories  and  the  model  of  
forgiveness   –   build   upon   and   deepen   the   first   model   of   translation   and   all   three   models   are  
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understanding  of   the  other’s  culture  and  customs,   then  the  model  of   the  exchange  of  memories  
offers  a  path  to  such  an  understanding.  This  second  model  entails  what  Ricœur  terms  a  “plural  
reading”   of,   in   particular,   a   culture’s   founding   events.   Such   events   and   their   endless  
commemorations   as   a   singular   event,   that   took  place   in   one  way   and  meant   something   to   one  
people   only,   can   stultify   a   culture’s   identity   closing   it   off   from   others   and   making   it  
“systematically  incommunicable.”9  As  Ricœur  points  out  elsewhere,  “[w]hat  we  celebrate  under  
the   title   of   founding   events   are,   essentially,   acts   of   violence   legitimated   after   the   fact   by   a  
precarious   state   of   right.”10   He   thinks   that   these   events   need   to   be   de-­‐‑sedimented   by   being  
recounted  differently  through  the  exchange  of  memories  presented  in  narrative  form.  Every  story  
entails   another   and   this   entanglement   of   stories  must   be   re-­‐‑vivified   (rather   than   redacted)   in   a  
new  approach  to  retelling  and  rereading  the  past  so  that  a  pluralistic  knot  of  tales  is  created.  Such  
diversity  will  enrich  the  event  and  our  understanding  of  it.  It  will  also  allow  a  cultural  identity  to  
realise   itself   as   a   narrative   identity,   mobile   and   flexible   as   opposed   to   being   a   fixed   eternal  
substance  that  excludes  as  much  as  it  includes.  Moreover,  insofar  as  the  past  lives  on  in  memory,  
the  exchange  of  memories  will  give  new  breath  to  what  has  been  entombed  and  lost  in  tradition.  
“The   past   is   a   cemetery   of   promises  which   have   not   been   kept”   claims  Ricœur.11   Through   the  
exchange   of   memories,   these   un-­‐‑kept   promises   can   be   brought   back   to   life.   This   exchange   of  
memories  would  seem  to  entail  a  “successful”  work  of  mourning  that  deals  with  the  loss  of  past  
promises  in  order  to  release  a  new  future  where  the  betrayals  of  the  past  are  finally  forgiven.  
And  with  “forgiveness”  we  reach  Ricœur’s  final  model  for  a  new  ethos  for  Europe  that  is  
linked   to   the   first   two:  “Forgiveness   is  a   specific   form  of   the   revision  of   the  past   […]  a   specific  
form  of  that  mutual  revision,  the  most  precious  result  of  which  is  the  liberation  of  promises  of  the  
past  which  have  not  been  kept.”12  This   third  model   complements   the  exchange  of  memories   in  
that  it  is  an  exchange  of  memories  of  suffering  –  both  those  inflicted  and  those  endured.  Ricœur  
claims   that   it   is   through   this   exchange   that   the   “debt”   can   be   shattered.   This   shattering   of   the  
debt,   owed   on   account   of   suffering   inflicted,   lifts   a   burden   that   has   driven   a   person   or   a  
community  into  isolation;  it  is  not  the  abolition  of  the  debt  and  certainly  not  its  forgetting.  Rather,  
forgiveness  consists  in  lifting  the  pain  of  the  debt.13  It  can  be  linked  to  the  gift:  “I  want  to  consider  
the  particular  structure  of  the  dilemmas  of  forgiveness  along  with  the  difficulties  that  result  from  
extending  the  problematic  of   forgiveness   to  a  model  of  exchange  tied  to   the  concept  of   the  gift.  
The  etymology  and  the  semantics  of  numerous  languages  encourage  this  comparison:  don-­‐‑pardon,  
gift-­‐‑forgiving,   dono-­‐‑perdono,   Geben-­‐‑Vergeben.”14   Forgiveness,   realised   through   the   exchange   of  
memories   of   suffering,   has   the   poetic   power   to   change   the   past   in   the   present.   Ricœur   offers  
various   examples   of   such  moments   of   forgiveness  which   do   not   annihilate   the   past   but   rather  
release  a  community  from  the  shackles  of   the  past   into  the  freedom  of   imagining  a  new  future:  
Willy  Brandt  at  Warsaw  or  Sadat   in   Jerusalem.  These  events  are  not  part  of   the  political  order;  
they   are   not   “institutional”   as   such.   Rather   they   take   on   meaning   due   to   their   “exceptional  
character.”15  They  effectively   rupture  an  existing  political  order,   creating   something  new   in   the  
space  of  international  politics.  
These,  then,  are  the  three  interconnected  models  of  “integration”  through  which  the  non-­‐‑
political   concerns   of   Europe’s   diverse   populations   may   achieve   realization   or   recognition   in  
political   and   juridical   institutions.   Models   of   linguistic   hospitality,   narrative   hospitality   and  
forgiveness;   these   are   all   models   of   mediation   and   assimilation   that   are   meant   to   promote  
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justice.16   This   theme   of   justice   and   forgiveness   takes   centre   stage   in   the   next   section   where   I  
discuss  Derrida’s  treatment  of  translation.  
2.  Derrida’s  Trial  of  the  Untranslatable  
Against   the   speculative   dichotomy   of   translatable/untranslatable   Ricœur   posits   the  
“practical  alternative”  of  faithfulness/betrayal,  to  which  I  return  below.  In  contrast,  Derrida  holds  
onto   the   untranslatable   as   the   very   test   of   translation   itself:   “Translation   always   and   only  
translates   the   untranslatable.”17  While   there   are   numerous  works  where   Derrida   puts   forward  
variations  on   this   thesis   I  will   focus  here  on  “Qu’est-­‐‑ce  qu’une   traduction   ‘relevante’?”18   In   this  
essay  Derrida  submits  his  own  experience  of  translation  to  what  he  terms  “the  trial  [l’épreuve]  of  
the  untranslatable”19  and  it  is  this  “trial”  that  I  would  like  to  examine  here.  
Derrida  remarks  that  his  interest  has  always  been  directed  to  “the  so-­‐‑called  undecidable  
words”  which  deliberately  resist  a  full  or  complete  translation  into  other  individual  words.  He  is  
interested   in   words   within   which   a   number   of   meanings   operate,   forcing   a   situation   of  
untranslatability  or  at   least  a   situation   in  which  any   translation  would   lose  a   certain  effect.  For  
example,  in  his  commentary  on  Benjamin’s  “The  Task  of  the  Translator,”  Derrida  plays  with  the  
word  “Babel,”  noting  that  as  a  proper  name  it  means  “City  of  God”  while  as  a  common  noun  it  
means  “confusion.”20  A  similar  situation  arises  with  the  name  Pierre  which  in  a  French  language  
context   immediately  sounds  like  pierre   [rock].  These  double  meanings  are  lost   in  translation  but  
much  more  significantly,  so   too   is   the  situation  of  undecidability.  As  Derrida  notes   in  relation   to  
perhaps  one  of  his  most  famous  commentaries:  “Whether  one  translates  pharmakon  as  ‘poison’  or  
‘remedy’   whether   one   comes   down   on   the   side   of   sickness   or   health,   life   or   death,   the  
undecidability   is   going   to   be   lost.”21   We   get   a   sense   of   this   lost   undecideable,   homophonic,  
homonymic  and  hence  untranslatable  effect  when  we  hear  the  word  relevante,  which  forms  part  
of  Derrida’s  title.  It  is  unclear  whether  this  word  is  a  French  word  that  has  become  English  or  an  
English  word  in  the  process  of  “Frenchification.”  The  issue  is  especially  complicated  in  Derrida’s  
hands  since  relevante  here  becomes  inflected  with  a  Germanic  and  philosophical  sense.22  To  it   is  
entrusted   what   Derrida   terms   “an   exorbitant   task,”   that   is,   defining   the   very   essence   of  
translation.  
A  “relevant”   translation  would  be  seen   to  be   the  “best”   translation  or  at   the  very   least,  
better  than  an  “irrelevant”  translation.  Derrida’s  title  here  –  “What  is  a  ‘relevant’  translation?”  –  
could  in  fact  be  rephrased  as  either  “What  is  translation?”  or,  perhaps  more  appropriately,  “What  
should  a  translation  be?”  If  Derrida’s  title  can  be  rephrased  or  translated  in  this  manner  then  why  
leave  the  word  “relevant”  in  the  title  at  all?  Derrida  justifies  (and  “to  justify”  is  one  of  the  senses  
of  “relevant”)  his  choice  by  noting  that  this  word  in  particular  has  been  “indispensable”  to  him  in  
the   translation   of   many   words   coming   from   and   into   many   languages.   Coming   from   Latin  
through  various  linguistic  paths  it  operates  on  the  borders  of  language.  It  is  a  word  which  doesn’t  
have  a  linguistic  home  so  to  speak  and  as  such  is  untranslatable.  
“Relevant”   is   also  a  word  which  occurs   in  Shakespeare’s  The  Merchant   of  Venice,   a  play  
that   deals   endlessly   in   the   economy   of   translation:   the   translation   of   a   pound   of   flesh   into   a  
supposed  monetary   equivalent,   Portia’s   translation   into   a   male   lawyer,   and   the   translation   of  
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if  the  subject  of  this  play  were,  in  short,  the  task  of  the  translator,  his  impossible  task,  his  duty,  his  
debt,  as  inflexible  as  it  is  unpayable.”23  It  is  this  notion  of  translation  as  impossible  yet  at  the  same  
time   necessary   that   is   of  most   interest   to  me   here.   In   this   “trial”   of   the   untranslatable  Derrida  
must   demonstrate   what   he   means   by   stating   that   nothing   is   translatable   and   nothing   is  
untranslatable  at  the  same  time.24  
Derrida  chooses  his  text,  The  Merchant  of  Venice,  for  four  reasons.  The  first  is  that  the  play  
is  driven  by  an  oath  or  a  promise.  Like  translation,  it  centres  on  a  promise  which  cannot  be  kept.  
Secondly  the  play,  like  translation,  revolves  around  economic  conditions.25  Thirdly,  at  the  heart  of  
the   play,   like   the   heart   of   any   translation,   is   an   incalculable   equivalence   or   impossible  
correspondence,   here   between   flesh   and   money.   And   finally   because   of   the   relation   between  
translation  and  conversion,  the  destruction  of  the  body  of  the  text  to  save  its  sense  (or   its  soul),  
and  the  conversion  of  Jew  to  Christian:  
This  impossible  translation,  this  conversion  […]  between  the  original,  literal  flesh  and  the  
monetary   sign   is   not   unrelated   to   the   Jew   Shylock'ʹs   forced   conversion   to   Christianity,  
since  the  traditional   figure  of   the  Jew  is  often  and  conventionally  situated  on  the  side  of  
the  body  and   the   letter   […]  whereas  St.  Paul   the  Christian   is  on   the  side  of   the  spirit  or  
sense,  of  interiority,  of  spiritual  circumcision.  This  relation  of  the  letter  to  the  spirit,  of  the  
body   of   literalness   to   the   ideal   interiority   of   sense   is   also   the   site   of   the   passage   of  
translation,   of   this   conversion   that   is   called   translation.  As   if   the  business   of   translation  
were   first   of   all   an  Abrahamic  matter   between   the   Jew,   the   Christian,   and   the  Muslim.  
And  the  relève,  like  the  relevance  I  am  prepared  to  discuss  with  you,  will  be  precisely  what  
happens   to   the   flesh   of   the   text,   the   body,   the   spoken   body   and   the   translated   body   –  
when  the  letter  is  mourned  to  save  the  sense.26  
Derrida  notes  that  while  Shylock  is  offered  three  times  the  amount  of  money  he  is  owed  
in  place  of  a  pound  of  Antonio’s  flesh,  he  refuses  this  substitution.  The  basis  of  this  refusal  is  the  
sacred  oath  he  has   taken,   for   the   contract  he  made  with  Antonio  was   sworn  not   only  between  
men  but  also,  and  more  importantly,  before  God.  This  oath,  made  in  the  language  of  men,  cannot  
be   undone   using   the   language   of   men;   a   bond   made   in   language   has   become   stronger   than  
language   itself.   This   leads   Derrida   to   assert   that   in   the   act   of   swearing   there   is   a   type   of  
transcendence   since   it   leads   man,   who   is   initially   positioned   in   language,   to   the   beyond   of  
language,   that   is,   towards   the   divine   law.   “The   oath   passes   through   language,   but   it   passes  
beyond   human   language.   This  would   be   the   truth   of   translation.”27   Translation,   as   a   promise,  
passes  through  language  while  at  the  same  time  transgressing  the  borders  of  language  each  time  
it  reaches  its  limit  –  in  the  untranslatable.  
Once  Shylock  refuses   to  accept   the   translation  of   the  pound  of   flesh   into   three   times   its  
supposed   monetary   value,   and   once   Antonio   recognizes   the   bond,   Portia   passes   her   verdict:  
“Then  the  Jew  must  be  merciful.”  For  Derrida  these  words   indicate  something  important  about  
the   history   of   the   relationship   between   the   Jew   and   the   Christian.   Theirs   is   a   history   of  
translation.   Shakespeare’s   play   is,   on   the   one   hand,   a   case,   a   trial,   of   a   particular   Christian  
(Antonio)  and  a  particular   Jew  (Shylock);  yet  on   the  other  hand,   it  mirrors   the  case,   the  history  
and  the   trial  of  Christian  power  and  the   Jew  in  general.28   In   this  history   it   is   the  Christian  who  
asks   for   forgiveness   and   the   Jew  who  must   forgive.  Of   course,   this   is   according   to   a  Christian  
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history   and   a   Christian   understanding   of   what   forgiveness   is.   However,   this   Christian  
understanding   is   really   a   Christian   ruse   under   which   is   hidden   an   economic,   theological   and  
political   play   of   power.   The   power   to   forgive   can   come   only   from   the   one   in   power.29  
Interestingly,  this  question  of  the  “power  to  forgive”  is  markedly  absent  from  Ricœur’s  account  of  
forgiveness   as   a   model   of   integration.   Perhaps   narrative   hospitality   and   the   exchange   of  
memories,  in  particular  those  of  suffering,  would  re-­‐‑empower  the  disenfranchised  allowing  them  
this  “power   to   forgive.”  However,  Ricœur   fails   to  make   this  explicit.  Portia’s   speech  on  mercy,  
designed  to  convert  Shylock  and  translate  the  bond,  is  not  genuine  but  a  hoax.  The  Christian  state  
offers   Shylock   an   ultimatum   –   forgive   the   bond   or   lose   everything.   It   offers   him   the   power   to  
forgive  the  debt.  Only  the  State  can  offer  Shylock  this  power  to  forgive  and  thus  break  the  law  of  
his  contract.  Yet  in  giving  this  power  to  forgive  the  State  is  also  attempting  to  impose  forgiveness  
and   so   is   in   fact   taking  away  Shylock’s   freedom   to   choose.  This,   then,   is   the  European   relation  
with  the  Jew;  it  is  based  on  the  principle  of  economic  power.  
However,   the   play   reflects  more   than  Christian   Europe’s   relation  with   the   Jew.   It   also  
reflects   the  manner   in  which   translation  –  whether   it   is  of   the  pound  of   flesh   into   its  monetary  
equivalent  and/or  of  Shylock’s  bond  into  a  moment  of  forgiveness  –  is  always  a  political  act.  For  
Derrida  language  is  not  a  vehicle  of  political  power  but  is  that  power  itself.  At  times  it  seems  that  
Ricœur  passes  over   this  possibility  of  an   imposed  and   therefore  violent   translation.  For  Ricœur  
“[t]o   translate   is   to   do   justice   to   a   foreign   intelligence   […]   your   language   is   as   important   as  
mine.”30  Yet,  it  is  often  the  case  that  to  translate  is  not  to  do  justice  but  to  capitulate  in  the  face  of  
unjust,   imperialist   demands,   or   it   is   perhaps   a  means   to   silence   dissenting   voices.  A   policy   of  
enforced  translation  is  often  at  the  heart  of  the  exercise  of  colonial  power,  something  that  Derrida  
himself  testifies  to  in  his  autobiographical  account  of  being  a  Franco-­‐‑Maghrebian  Jew  in  Algeria.31  
Translation  can  unify  diverse  peoples   through  forced  homogenisation.  Ricœur,  of  course,   in  his  
insistence  on  de-­‐‑sedimenting  and  retelling  a  nation’s  founding  events  would  no  doubt  reject  this  
form  of  homogenisation.  Nonetheless,  he  does  not  explicitly  comment  on  translation’s  power  to  
oppress  as  well  as  to  liberate.  
To  return  to  the  Merchant  of  Venice;  Shylock,  in  response  to  the  command  to  be  merciful,  
asks  “On  what  compulsion  must  I?”  to  which  Portia  responds  with  the  speech  on  mercy.  Mercy  
here   is  described   in   terms   similar   to  Shylock’s  understanding  of   the  oath.  Mercy   is  beyond   the  
human,  a   taste  of   the  divine;   like   the  oath   it  passes   through  language  but   is  also  beyond  it  and  
beyond   the   law.   In   this   paean   to   mercy,   mercy   as   forgiveness   becomes   like   prayer   offering   a  
double  benediction;  to  the  one  who  asks  and  the  one  who  receives.  In  terms  of  Derrida’s  “trial”  of  
translation  and  the  untranslatable,  the  crucial  moment  is  Portia’s  speech  on  mercy.  This  Derrida  
cites   in  English  and   translates   in   two  parts,  with   the   final  part  of  his   analysis  offering  his  own  
translation  of  Shakespeare.  
The   first  movement  of   the  speech   is  as   follows:  “The  quality  of  mercy   is  not  strain’d,/It  
droppeth  as  the  gentle  rain  from  heaven/Upon  the  place  beneath:  it  is  twice  blest,/It  blesseth  him  
that   gives,   and   him   that   takes.”32   In   this  way   then,  mercy   is   free;   it   cannot   be   commanded   or  
ordered  (an  ironic  point  given  that  Portia  has  just  demanded  it  from  Shylock).  Mercy  is  beyond  
decision,  foreign  to  the  law  and  to  economic  calculation.  As  in  Ricœur,  forgiveness  is  linked  to  the  
gift.   Like   the   rain,   it   is   uncontrollable   and   like   the   rain   it   comes   from   above.   The   second  
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‘Tis  the  mightiest  in  the  mightiest,  it  becomes  
The  throned  monarch  better  than  his  crown.  
His  sceptre  shoes  the  force  of  temporal  power,  
The  attribute  to  awe  and  majesty,  
Wherein  doth  sit  the  dread  and  fear  of  kings:  
But  mercy  is  above  this  sceptred  sway,  
It  is  enthroned  in  the  hearts  of  kings,  
It  is  an  attribute  to  God  himself;  
And  earthly  power  doth  then  show  likest  God’s  
When  mercy  seasons  justice.33  
For  Derrida  this  reveals  forgiveness  or  mercy  as  the  almighty-­‐‑ness  of  the  Almighty,  it  is  
the  very  essence  of  power,  of  omnipotence,  and  also  beyond  them  both.  The  question  this  raises  is  
that  of  the  superlative;  if  mercy  is  more  divine  than  the  divine,  more  monarchical  than  the  monarch  
or  mightier  than  the  mightiest;  it  must  belong  to  a  different  order  than  that  of  might.  Mercy  must  
belong   to   the   order   of   “the   impossible   that   is  more   than   impossible   and   therefore   possible.”34   This  
understanding   of   the   most   impossible   as   possible   has   its   parallels   in   the   translatable   and  
untranslatable.  As  Derrida  notes,   through  his   reading  of   the  Christian  mystic  Angelus  Silesius,  
God  would   belong   to   the   order   of   the  most   impossible.  What   is  more   than   impossible  would   be  
beyond   the   impossible;   that   is,  of   a  different  order   than   the   impossible   in  general   and   therefore  
possible:  
The  meaning  of  “possible,”  the  significance  of  the  concept  of  possibility,  meanwhile,  has  
undergone  a  mutation  at  the  point  and  limit  of  the  im-­‐‑possible  –  if  I  can  put  it  this  way  –  
and  this  mutation  indicates  what  is  at  stake  in  our  reflection  on  the  impossible  possibility  
of   translation:   there   is   no   longer   any   possible   contradiction   between   possible   and  
impossible  since  they  belong  to  two  heterogeneous  orders.35  
To   rephrase   this   in   terms   of   translation;   translatability  might   be   understood   as   having  
undergone   a   “mutation”   at   the   limit   of   un-­‐‑translatability   so   that   both   terms   now   belong   to   a  
different   order.   The   challenge   of   course   with   Derrida’s   thinking   here   is   to   think  
translatable/untranslatable   together.   It   is   not   the   case   that   Derrida   argues   for   a   “relative”  
translatability   or   a   “relative”   untranslatability,   but   rather   the   two   at   once.   As   Kathleen   Davis  
argues,   anything   less   would   leave   the   “conceptual   poles”   of   a   certain   oppositional   thinking  
intact.36   The   untranslatable,   as   Derrida   argues   here   and   elsewhere,   is   rather   that   which   sets  
translation   in   motion   and   continues   to   inhabit   every   translation   so   that   it   is   doomed   to  
perpetually  begin  again:  “this  untranslatable  translation,  this  new  idiom  makes  things  happen.”37  
Derrida   notes   that   what   is   at   play   in   this   speech   on   mercy,   and   in   particular   in   this  
section,  is  the  relation  between  the  power  to  pardon,  the  letter  of  the  flesh,  and  spirituality.  What  
is  “divine”  here,  what  is  “likest  God’s,”  is  the  power  to  forgive  interiorized  in  the  power  of  the  
state,  that  is,  in  the  heart  of  the  monarch.  It  is  a  power  that  is  not  reflected  in  earthly  attributes  –  
the   sceptre   or   the   crown   –   rather   being   a   God-­‐‑like   invisible   power.   “This   like,   this   analogy   or  
resemblance,  supports  a  logic  or  analogic  of  the  theologico-­‐‑political  translation,  of  the  translation  
of   the   theological   into   the   political.”38  Mercy   is   what   inflects   the   political   with   the   theological  
permitting  a  certain  translation  of  one  into  the  other.  
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The  French   translation  of  Portia’s   speech  by  Hugo,   renders  “seasons”   (in  “when  mercy  
seasons   justice”)   as   tempère.   While   Derrida   does   not   see   this   as   an   “incorrect”   translation,   he  
wishes  to  replace   it  with  the  word  relève.  This   translation  will  not  pay  off  all   its  debts;   it   in  fact  
will  not  answer  to  the  name  “translation”  if  by  this  name  we  understand  “the  transfer  of  an  intact  
signified  through  the  inconsequential  vehicle  of  any  signifier  whatsoever.”39  Derrida’s  translation  
will   rather   be   a   transformation   that   supplements   what   is   lacking   in   the   word   “seasons”   by  
substituting   it  with   relève.   For   his   choice   of  word  Derrida   offers   three   justifications   –   culinary,  
elevatory,  and  dialectical  –  which  I  will  now  outline.  
The  word   relève   responds   to   the   culinary   sense   of   “seasons.”  As  Derrida   notes   un   plat  
relevé  means   a   “seasoned   dish;”   a   dish  which   has   been  made   better   and  whose   taste   has   been  
heightened.  It  is  “seasons”  in  this  culinary  sense  that  Portia  appeals  to  when  she  speaks  of  mercy;  
adding  mercy  to  justice  means  justice  keeps  its  taste,  keeps  more  of  its  taste  and  is  thus  changed  
without   being   changed,   converted  without   being   converted   –   justice   is   improved   and   exalted.  
Derrida’s   second   justification   for   his   “untranslatable   translation”   is   that   relever   expresses   the  
notion  of  elevation.  Mercy  elevates   justice   to  a  higher  realm,   towards   the  Most  High.  Mercy,   in  
spiritualizing   justice,  offers   it   its  own   transcendence:   “mercy   sublimates   justice.”40   In   this   sense  
Derrida’s   third   justification   is   an   expansion   of   the   notion   of   relève   so   that   it   includes  
“sublimation;”  a  word  most  often  (problematically)  encountered  in  a  Hegelian  context.  
The  noun  relève  and  the  verb  relever  are  the  words  Derrida  used  to  translate  the  Hegelian  
terms  Aufheben  and  Aufhebung.41  These  German  terms  were  hailed  by  Hegel  himself  as  reflecting  
“the   speculative   risk   of   the   German   language”   and   as   such   are   often   cited   as   being  
untranslatable.42  They  tie   in   too  with  the  notion  of  economy.  Elsewhere  Derrida  argues  that   the  
deconstruction  of  metaphysics  requires  the  move  from  a  speculative  and  restricted  philosophical  
economy   to   a   general   economy.43   “Restricted   philosophical   economy”   would   be   that   of   the  
traditional  understanding  of  philosophy  which  leaves  no  remainder,  no  unknown  outside  of   its  
own  closed  system.  In  contradistinction  to  this,  deconstruction’s  “general  economy”  would  allow  
for  the  remainder  as  remainder  –  an  always  possible  outside  that  would  remain  unknown.  This  
also  parallels  Derrida’s  concerns  regarding   translation.  Against  an  understanding  of   translation  
that  carries  across  a  self-­‐‑identical  signified  from  one  signifier  to  another  and  without  remainder;  
Derrida   seeks   a   translation   which   embraces   its   necessary   loss   as   constitutive.   In   terms   of   the  
Aufhebung;  the  Hegelian  notion  leaves  nothing  outside,  even  after  traversing  differences  it,  like  so  
many  philosophical  concepts,  seeks  to  escape  the  effect  of  différance.  Derrida’s  French  translation  
questions  this  “operation  without  remainder,”  as  translator  Alan  Bass  stresses:  
Derrida’s  playful   translation  of  aufhebt   (third  person  singular  of  Aufheben)  keeps   the  hebt  
(lève,   lifts),  but  changes  the  auf-­‐‑  (up)  to  a  re-­‐‑  […]  the  stress  is  on  the  effect  of  substitution  
and   difference,   of   repetition,   that   is   inscribed   in   aufhebt.   Further,   the   auf-­‐‑   is   related   to  
negation-­‐‑and-­‐‑preservation  in  a  higher  sphere;  the  re-­‐‑  questions  the  metaphysics  of  negation,  
the  theology  implicit  in  dialectical  negation  as  a  raising  up.44  
Thus  in  translating  “seasons”  with  relève  Derrida  offers  a  “philosophical  meaning’”  to  the  
discourse   on   justice   seasoned   with   mercy.   The   movement   of   Aufhebung,   argues   Derrida,   is   a  
process   of   establishing   relevance.   It   would   thus,   in   this   instance,   relate  mercy   to   justice   as   an  
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in   this   translation   the   relation   of   spirit   and   flesh,   of  Christian   and   Jew.  All   of  which   is   not,   as  
Derrida  notes,  unrelated  to  a  certain  European  post-­‐‑Lutheran  understanding  of  translation.45  For  
Hegel,  furthermore,  mercy  is  a  critical  stage  in  the  movement  towards  absolute  knowledge  as  the  
truth  of  the  Christian  religion.  Hegel’s  Aufhebung  is  a  type  of  translation  into  absolute  knowledge  
of   the  Christian  narrative  of   the  resurrection.46  All  of  which   leads  Derrida  to  claim:  “Mercy   is  a  
relève,  it  is  in  its  essence  an  Aufhebung.  It  is  a  translation  as  well.”47  Mercy,  like  Aufhebung  elevates  
and  preserves  justice  at  a  higher  level.  At  the  same  time  it  negates  justice  as  the  law,  in  that,  as  we  
saw  above,  it  exceeds  the  law.  In  this  sense  it  mirrors  Benjamin’s  understanding  of  translation  as  
that   in  which  “the  original   rises   into  a  higher  and  purer   linguistic  air,   as   it  were.”  Mercy  most  
resembles   the  divine  when   it   elevates,  preserves,   and  negates   the   law  and  as   such  “is  a   sort  of  
human  translation  of  divinity.”48  
Do  these  justifications  suffice  for  Derrida’s  translation?  As  noted,  it  is  perhaps  not  really  
a   translation   in   the   strictest   sense   but   “rather   one   of   those   other   things   in   tr.,   a   transaction,  
transformation,  travail,  travel  –  and  a  treasure  trove  [trouvaille].”49  The  word  relève  is  involved  in  a  
transaction   with   “seasons”;   it   substitutes   it,   relieves   [relève]   it   of   its   duty,   in   exchange   for  
transforming   it.   It   is   travail,   labour,   or  work,   in   that   it   sets   to  work   not   only   a  multiplicity   of  
meanings  but  also  a  multiplicity  of  languages;  French,  German  and  English,  and  because  of  this  
richness  it  is  a  semantic  treasure  trove.  More  importantly  for  Derrida,  it  demonstrates  that  “every  
translation   should   be   relevant   by   vocation.”  Here  we   find   the   answer   to   the   title   of   Derrida’s  
essay  “What   is  a   ‘Relevant’  Translation?”  that   is,  “What  should  a   translation  be?”  A  translation  
should  be  relevant;  which  would  mean  that  a  translation  should  answer  to  the  call  of  the  original  
(“by  vocation”)  to  elevate  it,  preserve  it,  negate  it,  interrupt  it,  transform  it,  and  put  it  to  work.  In  
this  way   it  would  guarantee   the  original’s   sur-­‐‑vival   as  prolonged   life   and   life   after  death.50  As  
Derrida  phrases  it:  
Isn'ʹt   this  what  a   translation  does?  Doesn'ʹt   it  guarantee   these   two  survivals  by   losing  the  
flesh  during  a  process  of  conversion  [change]?  By  elevating  the  signifier  to  its  meaning  or  
value,  all  the  while  preserving  the  mournful  and  debt-­‐‑laden  memory  of  the  singular  body,  
the  first  body,  the  unique  body  that  the  translation  thus  elevates,  preserves,  and  negates  
[relève]?  Since  it  is  a  question  of  a  travail  –  indeed,  as  we  noted,  a  travail  of  the  negative  –  
this  relevance  is  a  travail  of  mourning,  […]  a  faithful  and  mournful  memory.51  
I   return   below   to   this   idea   of   a   mournful   memory.   In   terms   of   the   “trial   of   the  
untranslatable,”  how  does  Derrida’s  “definition”  of   translation  above  account   for  his  claim  that  
everything   is   translatable  and  untranslatable  at   the   same   time?  “Seasons”   is  untranslatable   if  we  
think  the  translatable  as  that  without  loss,  remainder  or  mourning.  It   is  endlessly  translatable  if  
we   reconsider   the   very   idea   of   translation   under   the   terms   outlined   above   as   transformation,  
negation  and  elevation.  For  Derrida   translation   is   caught   in   this  uncomfortable  double  bind.   In  
the  next  section  I  look  at  Ricœur’s  somewhat  different  approach  to  the  untranslatable.  
3.  Ricœur’s  Trial  of  the  Foreign  
The   title  of  Antoine  Berman’s   1984  work  L’épreuve   de   l’étranger   provides  Ricœur  with  a  
phrase  that  threads  its  way  throughout  the  latter’s  writings  on  translation.  It  is  a  phrase  that  can  
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be   variously   translated   as   the   “trial   or   test   of   the   stranger”   or,   as   it   is   rendered   in   the  English  
translation   of   Berman’s   work,   The   Experience   of   the   Foreign.52   In   this   work   Berman   traces   the  
importance   of   translation   back   to   the   idea   of   'ʹGermanity'ʹ   (Deutschheit),   to   the   idea   that  Martin  
Luther’s  translation  of  the  Bible  was  a  historically  definitive  event  that  placed  translation  at   the  
heart   of   German   culture,   language,   and   identity.   In   this   Berman   follows   that   wing   of   the  
hermeneutic  tradition  which  elevates  the  reformation  debates  in  general  and  Luther  in  particular  
to  an  importance  that  they  perhaps  do  not  deserve.  As  Jean  Grondin  has  pointed  out  “this  pivotal  
period   is   much   less   revolutionary   than   the   classic   history   of   hermeneutics,   itself   indebted   to  
Protestant   theology,  would   suggest.”53  Regardless  of  Luther’s   importance  here,   it   is   true   to   say  
that   translation   operated   around   the   end   of   the   eighteenth   century   as   a   way   of   identifying   a  
peculiarly  German   culture   and   education   –  Bildung.   German   translators   at   that   time   sought   to  
define  themselves  against  the  prevailing  French  and  English  literary  trends.  Rather  than  aiming  
for  a  transparent  translation  where  all  traces  of  the  “original”  text’s  foreignness  had  been  erased,  
German   translators   endeavoured   to   make   the   foreign   as   obvious   as   possible.   In   1767   Johann  
Gottfried  Herder  advocated  “bending”  German  itself  to  a  foreign  strain  in  order  to  accrue  “great  
advances”   in   the  German   language.54   In   this   regard,   Johann  Heinrich  Voss’s   translations  of   the  
Odyssey   (1781)  and  the   Iliad   (1793),   the  first   to  retain  the  hexameter   in  German,  had  a  profound  
impact  on  the  German  literary  scene.55  They  ushered  in  an  openness  to  translation  as  a  possibility  
of   transformation   –   not   of   the   foreign   text   but   of   the   German   language   itself.   Between   Voss’s  
Odyssey   and   Iliad   Immanuel   Kant’s   three   critiques   appeared;   the   German   philosophical  
counterpoint   to   (one  might  even  say  the  German  philosophical   translation  of)   the  French  socio-­‐‑
political  revolution.56  
This  period  marks,  then,  the  creation  of  a  German  identity  through  appropriating  what  is  
foreign  or  other.  Herder’s  “bending”  of  the  German  language  might  at  first  seem  to  be  an  ethical  
“foreignizing”   strategy   in   the   terms   of   contemporary   translation   theory.   However,   it   is   not  
without  nationalistic  and  political  motivation.  Berman  begins  his  work  with  a  series  of  quotations  
from  Leibniz   to   von  Humboldt   all   praising   the   gift   of   the  German   language   (and   the  German  
language   alone)   to   welcome   foreign   languages   to   itself.   In   this   bending-­‐‑welcoming   German  
demonstrates   its   own   flexibility   and   its   commensurability   with   the   “great”   works   of   classical  
Greek  and  Latin  authors.  This  movement  of  appropriation,  of  bringing  the  “foreign”  author  to  the  
native  German  reader,  allows  the  German  to  discover  herself  in  this  encounter  with  the  other.  It  
is  also  a  strategy  advocated  by  the  few  and  for  the  few.  Venuti,  following  Berman  and  Ward,  has  
pointed   out   that   Schleiermacher   and   Schlegel’s   approach   to   translation   is   marked   by   its  
engagement  not  with  contemporary  literature,  but  rather  with  the  literature  of  the  educated  elite  
–  the  works  of  Cicero,  Plato  and  Homer.  As  he  claims:  “Because  this  is  a  strongly  nationalist  elite,  
it   employs   foreignizing   translation   in   a   remarkable   project   of   German   cultural   imperialism,  
through   which   the   linguistic   community   ‘destined’   for   global   domination   achieves   it.   Here  
nationalism  is  equivalent  to  universalism.”57  Thus  appropriation  of  the  foreign  can  in  fact  hide  a  
certain  will  to  domination.  
Ricœur,  in  his  writings  on  translation  appears  to  follow  in  this  tradition  of  welcoming  the  
foreign   in   order   to   enrich   oneself.  His  model   of   linguistic   hospitality   eschews   the   theoretically  
untranslatable,   so   crucial   to   Derrida,   in   order   to   make   room   for   the   “practical”   alternative   of  
faithfulness  and  betrayal.  As  noted  above,  Ricœur  posits  a  “principle  of  universal  translatability”  
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understood  can  be   taken  home,  what  can  be   translated  can  be  appropriated  and   thus  universal  
translatability  masks  an  (in  principle)  universal  appropriability.  For  Ricœur,  what  motivates  the  
welcoming  act  of  translation  is  not  reducible  to  either  constraint  or  usefulness  but  is  found  rather  
in   the  desire   to   translate;   “the  broadening   of   the  horizon  of   their   own   language  –   together  with  
what  they  have  all  called  formation,  Bildung,  that  is  to  say  both  configuration  and  education,  and  
as  a  bonus   […]   the  discovery  of   their  own   language.”58  Translation  allows   the  discovery  of   the  
self   –   but  what   are   the   ethics   of   this   journey   of   self-­‐‑   discovery?   Ricœur’s   ethics   of   translation  
would   seem   to   centre  on   the  question  of  balancing  pleasure   –   the   “pleasure  of  dwelling   in   the  
other’s  language”  and  the  “pleasure  of  receiving  the  foreign  word  at  home.”59  But  surely  if  we  are  
to  respect  the  alterity  of  the  other  what  we  need  is  not  a  balance  between  same  and  other  but  a  
situation  of  dissymmetry  that  is  closer,  perhaps,  to  the  asymmetry  of  what  Ricœur  elsewhere  calls  
the   “forgiveness   equation”;   a   disjunction   between   ownness   and   foreignness   that   is   not   simply  
bridged  by  translation  but  allowed  to  remain  unbridgeable.  
So   why   does   Ricœur   want   to   lose   the   theoretically   untranslatable?   What   “threatens”  
Europe   he   claims   is   not   “the   triumph   of   one   great   cultural   language   as   the   sole   instrument   of  
communication;  rather  it  is  the  danger  of  incommunicability  through  a  protective  withdrawal  of  
each  culture   into   its  own  linguistic   tradition.”60  This  concern   is  similar   to   that  around  founding  
events  which,  as  we  have  already  seen,  exercise  an   illegitimate  control  over  collective  memory,  
freezing   cultural   identities   into   a   systematic   “incommunicability.”   This   incommunicability   of  
cultural   identity   is   to   be   shaken  up   by   a   new   invigorated   and  plural   reading   of   the   past.   This  
threat  of  incommunicability  is  surely  to  be  taken  seriously  on  every  level.  A  person  who  retreats  
entirely   into   themselves   is   lost   in   their   own   abyss.   It   is   no   co-­‐‑incidence   that   the   language   of  
depression  often  echoes  this  sense  of  being  cut-­‐‑off,  of  being  “stuck  in  one’s  own  head”  of  being  
“unable   to   get   out   of   oneself.”   Such   isolation,   such   untranslatability,   can   lead   eventually   to  
destruction.   At   the   social   level,   endogamous   societies,   such   as   the   Samaritans,   invariably  
disappear   over   time   whereas   exogamous   societies   flourish;   genetic   translation   does   indeed  
produce   enrichment   or   expansion.   Whether   we   take   translation   in   its   strict   sense   as   between  
languages   or   in   its   broad   sense   as   between   cultures   and   people,   total   untranslatability   surely  
marks   the   end   of   a   language   or   a   culture.   The   encounter   with   what   is   other   and   the  
transformative  impact  of  this  encounter  is  necessary  to  anything  that  can  be  described  as  having  
“life.”  This  is  what  Derrida  aims  at  in  describing  translation  as  the  survival  of  a  text,  its  “living-­‐‑
on”   in  a   transformed  state.  However,  as  noted  above,  Derrida  claims  a   text   is  both   translatable  
and   untranslatable   at   the   same   time.   And   it   is   this   tension   of   two   things   at   once   that   creates   a  
discomfort  at  the  heart  of  Derrida’s  model  of  translation  –  which  is  also,  as  in  Ricœur,  a  model  of  
hospitality  and  a  model  of  mourning.  
Ricœur’s  reason  for  wanting  to  escape  the  untranslatable  is  not  only  due  to  the  threat  of  
isolation   it   carries,   but   also   because   of   its   implications.   The   idea   of   the   untranslatable   or   the  
impossibility  of  translation  between  languages  has  its  roots,  claims  Ricœur,  on  one  side  of  a  set  of  
“ruinous  alternatives.”  On  the  one  hand,  if  we  travel  the  route  of  the  Sapir  and  Whorf  hypothesis,  
there  is  the  claim  that  linguistic  diversity  reflects  a  radical  heterogeneity  between  peoples.  This  is  
the  idea  that  each  language  imposes  a  world  view,  or  in  Donald  Davidson’s  terms  a  “conceptual  
scheme,”  which  is  so  unique  to  the  people  who  use  it  that  translation  simply  cannot  take  place.  
Such  an  understanding,  of  course,  passes  over  the  very  fact  of  translation  –  that  it  takes  place  all  
the  time  even  between  the  most  divergent  languages  such  as  Hopi  and  English.  As  Ricœur  wryly  
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observes,  in  the  absence  of  a  theory  of  translation  we  may  have  to  conclude,  then,  that  “bilinguals  
are  schizophrenics.”61  
The   alternative   to   this   untranslatable/translatable   impasse,  which  marks   the   theoretical  
approach,   is   to   be   found   in   acknowledging   the   fact   of   translation   and   proceeding   from   there.  
However,  before  Ricœur  makes  that  move,  he  stops  to  consider  the  various  attempts  to  establish  
a  theoretical  basis   for   translation.  He  notes  that  those  who  argue  that  translation  is   theoretically  
possible   tend   to   rely   on   the   notion   of   a   “common   fund.”   This   “common   fund”   is   variously  
understood  either  as  a  prelapsarian  original  language,  sought  for  in  the  hermetic  traditions,  or  as  
a  set  of  a  priori  codes  which  can  be  constructed  along  the  lines  of  Leibniz’s  universal  lexicon  of  
“simple   ideas.”  This  alternative   to   the  untranslatable  –   that   is,  a  universal   language   that  would  
provide  the  standard  of  all  translations  as  the  “third”  text  between  source  and  target  –  fails  and  
has   to   fail,   argues  Ricœur,   for   two   crucial   reasons.   Firstly,   because   a   “lexicon   of   simple   ideas”  
presupposes   a   total   equivalence   between   sign   and   thing;   it   does   not   allow   for   the   space   or  
mediation  of  language  between  speaker  and  world  and  the  necessary  arbitrariness  and  ambiguity  
that  ensues.  Secondly,  and  in  a  not  unrelated  vein  “no  one  can  say  how  the  natural  languages  […]  
could   be   derived   from   the   supposed   perfect   language:   the   gap   between   the   universal   and  
empirical   languages,   between   what   is   a   priori   and   what   is   historical,   certainly   appears  
insurmountable.”62  
Thus   far,   Ricœur’s   account   is   not   so   very   far   from   Derrida’s.   The   emphasis   on   the  
necessity  of  mediation,  the  ensuing  loss  of  total  transparency  and  the  subsequent  abandoning  of  
ideas  of  a  “universal”  language  can  all,  I  believe,  find  their  echoes  in  Derrida’s  own  work.  What  I  
want   to  argue,  however,   is   that  although  Ricœur  gives  up   the  untranslatable,  and  gives  up   the  
idea  of  a  universal   language,  positing   instead  the   idea  of  “an  equivalence  without   identity,”  he  
nonetheless  falls  into  the  trap  of  subsuming  the  other  into  the  same  and  so  undermines  the  ethical  
impetus   behind   the  model   of   linguistic   hospitality   he  wants   to   promote.  How?   I   claim   that   he  
does  so  in  two  ways.  On  the  one  hand  Ricœur,  as  noted  above,  follows  his  romantic  precursors,  
Goethe,  Herder,  Schlegel  and  so  on,  in  privileging  the  role  of  appropriation.  In  Ricœur’s  case  it  is  
a  matter  of  emphasizing  “ownness”  and   integration.   I  am  not  claiming   that  Ricœur  does  so   for  
the  same  reasons  –  that  is  for  the  creation  of  some  sort  of  national  culture  –  but  that  he  does  so  
nonetheless.   Secondly,   in   viewing   the   untranslatable   as   something   to   be   eschewed,   something  
which  might  occur  “intermittently”  but  which  ultimately  can  be  overcome,  Ricœur  ends  up  with  
a  “relative”  idea  of  the  foreign.  That  is,  Ricœur’s  account  does  not  allow  for  a  radical  foreign  or  
other  who  would  exceed  one’s  capacity  to  understand.  While  there  may  occasionally  be  failures  
to  understand  the  other,  an  occasional  untranslatability;  these  are  merely  incidental  they  are  not  
inherent  to  the  encounter  with  the  other.  This  has  implications  for  his  models  of  hospitality  and  
of  mourning.  In  the  next  section  I  support  these  claims  by  contrasting  Ricœur’s  versions  of  these  
models  with  those  of  Derrida.  
4.  Hospitality,  Mourning,  and  the  Untranslatable  
Ricœur  draws  on  the  Freudian  concepts  of  the  work  [Arbeit/travail]  of  memory  and  work  
of  mourning   to  describe   the  practice  of   translation.  Translation,   like   the  work  of   remembering,  
must  go  through  the  trial  of  resistance,  a  double  resistance  in  fact.  On  the  one  hand  the  resistance  
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of  the  other,  it  itself  will  be  forgotten.63  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  resistance  of  the  source  or  
departure   language  which   challenges   the   translator   in   her   initial   approach   to   the   text   “as   the  
presumption  of  non-­‐‑translatability.”64  This  initial  resistance  of  the  foreign  text  to  the  work  of  the  
translator   is,   however,   only   fantastical   for   Ricœur;65   once   the   work   has   begun   the   block   of  
untranslatability   gets   chipped   away.   The   translator   then   encounters   only   small   segments   of  
untranslatability   which   can   be   “worked   through”   in   a   creative   betrayal   leading   to   the  
“construction  of  the  comparable.”66  
The   work   of   mourning   that   falls   to   translation   involves   “giv[ing]   up   the   ideal   of   the  
perfect  translation.”67  The  promise  of  a  perfect  translation  is  the  promise  of  some  kind  of  literary  
absolute,   found   in   the   work   of   the   German   Romantics,   which   governs   an   approximation  
enterprise  regenerating  the  target  language  and  potentiating  the  source  language.68  This  dream  of  
a   perfect   translation   has   had   its   benefits,   notes   Ricœur;   specifically   in   de-­‐‑provincialising   the  
mother   tongue,   forcing   it   to  see   itself  as  one   language  amongst  many.  The  danger,  however,   in  
this   promise   of   perfection   is   firstly   an   idea   of   “omni-­‐‑translation”   wherein   all   untranslatables  
would  be  erased.  This,  notes  Ricœur,   is   a   cosmo-­‐‑political  dream  of  a  “rationality   fully   released  
from   cultural   constraints   and   community   restrictions.”69   The   second   danger   is   found   in  
Benjamin’s  “pure  language;”  that  messianic  promise  at  the  heart  of  “The  Task  of  the  Translator.”  
These  aims  of  perfect  translation  are  married  to  the  idea  of  translation  as  gain,  a  gain  without  any  
loss:  
It  is  this  very  same  gain  without  loss  that  we  must  mourn  until  we  reach  an  acceptance  of  
the  impassable  difference  of  the  peculiar  and  the  foreign.  Recaptured  universality  would  
try   to   abolish   the   memory   of   the   foreign   and   maybe   the   love   of   one’s   own   language,  
hating  the  mother  tongue’s  provincialism.  Erasing  its  own  history,  the  same  universality  
would   turn  all  who  are   foreign   to   it   into   language’s  stateless  persons,  exiles  who  would  
have  given  up  the  search  for  the  asylum  afforded  by  a  language  of  reception.70  
This   account  would   seem   to  put  paid   to  my   argument   that  Ricœur   falls   into   a   kind  of  
universalism.  However,  there  is  an  emphasis  in  Ricœur  on  a  movement  of  mutual  appropriation,  
of  mediation  or  balancing,  a  suggestion  that  ultimately  “the  agonistics  that  make  a  drama  of  the  
translator’s  task”  can  eventually  be  overcome.71  He  holds  out  the  hope  that,  in  mourning  the  idea  
of   a   perfect   translation,  we   can   open   up   a   future   happiness   in   linguistic   hospitality.   As   noted  
above   in   the   description   of   Ricœur’s   second   model   of   integration,   that   is   the   “exchange   of  
memories,”  Ricœur  seems  to  favour  a  successful  work  of  mourning  over  a  failed  one.  Of  course,  
this   does   not   mean   Ricœur   is   committed   to   a   fixed   translation,   but   rather   that   he   can   find  
happiness   in   any   translation   regardless   of   its   unfinished   status.   For   Ricœur,   the   necessity   to  
“retranslate   after   the   translator”   produces   a   successful   process   of   recollection   and   mourning;  
rather   than   a   melancholy   or   mania.72   Translation   is   arduous,   Ricœur   seems   to   say,   but   that  
doesn’t  mean   it   is   impossible.  Untranslatableness   is  never  “so   radical   that   translation  has   to  be  
declared  impossible  in  principle.”73  An  aporia  such  as  translation  or  memory  faithful  to  the  past  
may  pose   “a   genuine  difficulty   to   thought”   but   never   “an   impasse”   as   such.74   Even  where   the  
issue  of  the  untranslatable  is  tackled  head  on,  in  the  last  of  Ricœur’s  essays  on  translation,  even  
there   the   impasse,   the  untranslatable   is  worked   through;  comparables  are  constructed   from  the  
level   of   culture,   to   discourse,   to   text,   to   sentence.   In   this   downward   shrinking   trajectory   the  
translator  finds  a  way  through.  
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In  contrast  to  this  difficult  but  possible  work,  Derrida  poses  the  challenge  of  thinking  two  
things  at  once  and  it  is  here,  I  think,  that  we  can  supplement  Ricœur.  We  can  say  yes  to  all  that  
Ricœur   offers  while   simply   adding   one  more   thing   –   the   constant   discomfort,   the   irresolvable  
disquietude   of   a   failed   mourning   rather   than   the   happiness   of   a   successful   one.   This   failed  
mourning   is   intimately   linked   with   the   gesture   of   hospitality.   Derrida   gives   the   example   of  
certain  Mexican  cultures  wherein  it  is  traditional  to  welcome  the  guest  to  one’s  home  with  tears,  
to  cry  at  the  arrival  of  the  other.  The  reason  for  this  strange  rite  of  hospitality  is  that  newcomers  
are  considered  to  be  ghosts  of  the  dead  coming  back  and  as  such  are  to  be  greeted  with  tears  of  
mourning.75  I  want  to  claim  that  if  we  are  using  translation  as  an  ethical  model  of  how  to  relate  to  
the  other  person,  of  how  to  in  some  way  deal  with  the  fact  of  our  diversity  –  which  seems  to  be  
what   Ricœur   wants   to   do   –   then   we   have   to   take   seriously   Derrida’s   challenge   to   think  
translatable  and  untranslatable  at  the  same  time.  Under  the  rubric  of  this  challenge  I  would  claim  
that  it  is  precisely  to  the  untranslatable  in  every  other  –  text,  language,  culture,  person  [autrui]  –  
that  we  must  be  hospitable.  This   is  what  makes  absolute  hospitality   impossible,  uncomfortable  
and   interminable.   Because   we   can   never   succeed   in   welcoming   that   which   exceeds   us,   our  
welcoming   is   thus   also   always   and   already   a   failed   mourning:   “I   speak   of   mourning   as   the  
attempt,  always  doomed  to  fail  (thus  a  constitutive  failure,  precisely),  to  incorporate,   interiorize  
introject,  subjectivize  the  other  in  me  […]  a  mourning  that  is  moreover  impossible.”76  
To   a   certain   extent   it   seems   as   though   Ricœur’s   position   converges   here   with   that   of  
Derrida.   If  we  go  back  to   the   former’s  “models  of   integration”  we  remember   that   those  models  
involved   a   constant   retelling   of   narrative   identities   through   which   sedimented   features   and  
broken  promises  of   the  past  could  be  released  to  a  new  future  of   forgiveness.  Certainly  Ricœur  
does  not  claim  that  narrative  identity  is  fixed  or  stable,  rather  it   is  mobile  and  flexible  changing  
over   time   through   encounters   and   entanglements   with   various   others.   However,   this  
interminability   is   not   Derrida’s   impossible.   It   is   not   simply   the   case   for   Derrida   that   we   can  
“always  say  the  same  thing  differently”  so  that  the  other’s  narrative  (or  our  own)  can  be  simply  
retold   over   and   over.   Derrida   goes   further   by   claiming   that   in   this   retelling   there   remains   an  
untranslatable   “kernel”   that   we   never   even   approach.   Because   this   untranslatable   remains,   the  
desire   to   retranslate   is   born.   Derrida   offers   a   “dogmatic   syllogism”   on   his   understanding   of  
translation:   “1.   Quasi-­‐‑parricide   is   the   condition   of   translation;   2.   Translation   always   and   only  
translates  the  untranslatable;  3.  Therefore  quasi-­‐‑parricide  remains  the  condition  of  the  translation  
of  the  untranslatable.”77  
I  propose  that  the  untranslatable  is  what  remains  arrivant,  still  to  come,  in  the  other,  that  
which   escapes   our   horizon   of   expectation.   In   every   other   there   remains   this   arrivant,   this  
remainder  that  escapes  our  appropriation.  In  the  relation  with  the  other  we  are  in  the  double  bind  
of  what  Derrida   terms  “ex-­‐‑appropriation”:  of  giving  oneself  over   to   the  other  and  of   taking   the  
other   into   oneself   without   obliterating   their   alterity.   This   is   the   very   condition   of   originary  
mourning.  To  remember  the  dead  is  to  keep  them  alive  in  one’s  own  self,  but  to  appropriate  them  
and   hence   erase   their   otherness   is   to   be   unfaithful.   To   forget   the   dead,   however,   to   not  
appropriate   them,   is   equally   unfaithful   for   it   is   to   deny   their   living-­‐‑on.   Mourning   thus   is   a  
“constitutive   failure.”78   Yet,   this   mourning   does   not   wait   for   the   so-­‐‑called   “actual”   death.  We  
mourn  in  the  welcoming  of  the  Other  because,  as  with  a  translation,  we  are  doomed  to  failure  –  
we   can   never   fully   welcome   or   finish   welcoming.   A   translation   can   only   translate   the  




Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





a   translation  takes  place,   the  untranslatable  remains  (the   impossible  haunts  the  possible)  but   its  
untranslatable-­‐‑ness  is  now  hidden.  Every  translation  begins  in  failure  because  it  cannot  succeed  
in  carrying  over  all  that  a  text  may  say;  each  accomplished  translation  (if  we  can  ever  say  that  a  
translation  is  accomplished  or  finished)  manically  mourns  its  loss.  
The   loss   mourned   for   is   not   only   what   it   could   not   “carry   across”   but   is   also   the  
untranslatable  itself.  Of  course  another  untranslatable  emerges  as  soon  as  another  text  emerges  –  
the   translation   which   also   demands   further   translation   has   its   own   untranslatable.   The  
untranslatable   itself   as   arrivant   lives-­‐‑on.   In   our   relation  with   the   other  we   attempt   to   translate  
them;  appropriate  them,  take  them  home,  offer  them  welcome,  understand  them.  But  they  remain  
untranslatable;  the  arrivant  is  always  yet  to  come  even  in  its  return.  As  such  we  mourn  not  only  
the  other’s  death  (to  come)  but  also  we  mourn  what  we  cannot  welcome,  what  remains  absolutely  
other.  It  is  this  caveat  that  I  find  missing  in  Ricœur  –  this  discomfort  of  Derrida’s  double  bind.  
The   issue   of   translation   then   as   a   “quasi-­‐‑parricide”   is   crucial.   Within   the   narrow  
understanding   of   translation   as   transposition   of   one   language   into   another   (and   all   the  
complications   even   this   narrow  understanding   entails)   a   translation   quasiment   kills   its   parents.  
There   comes   to  mind  an   initial   straightforward  way  of   reading   this   claim.  A   translation   comes  
after   the   “original,”   like   a   child   after   its   parents.   A   translation   takes   (its)   life   from   the   parent-­‐‑
original   and   lives-­‐‑on   after   the   death   of   its   parent.   Yet   the   term   “quasi-­‐‑parricide”   is   richer   and  
more  ambiguous  than  this,  the  “qua  si,”  the  “as  if”  must  be  read  with  all  its  force.  “Translation  is  
an  as  if-­‐‑  (quasi-­‐‑)  parricide,”  which  is  to  say  that  it  is  not  a  parricide,  is  not  a  “murder”  but  merely  
appears   as   such,   or   we   could   say   it   is   an   “almost”   murder,   not   quite   a   murder,   perhaps   an  
unfinished   (or   unfinishable)   murder.   Yet   the   question   then   is   who   is   “as   if   murdered”?  
“Parricide”  is  the  cidium,  the  killing,  of  a  parus,  a  relative.  A  translation  then  “as  if,  almost,  kills  a  
relative”   and  we   could   think  of   this   “relative”   as   the   other   language.   In   this  way   a   translation  
looks  as  if  it  kills  the  other  language  or  text,  yet  it  does  not  in  fact  do  so.  Rather  a  translation  is  a  
text’s  very  survival.  
I  would  like  to  rephrase  Derrida’s  dogmatic  syllogism  on  translation  so  that  it  is  made  to  
address  the  relation  with  the  Other:  1.  Almost/as  if  killing  the  other  is  the  condition  of  the  relation  
to  the  other  2.  The  relation  to  the  other  always  and  only  relates  to  the  arrivant  (the  untranslatable)  
in  the  other  and  3.  Therefore  almost/as  if  killing  the  other  remains  the  condition  of  the  relation  to  
the  arrivant  in  the  other.  As  we  saw,  this  is  in  a  way  what  Derrida  calls  originary  mourning;  the  
constitutive  failure,  the  double  bind  of  ex-­‐‑appropriation.  The  relation  to  the  other  as  translating  is  
to  appropriate  the  other  and  hence  to  almost  erase,  to  as  if  murder,  their  alterity;  yet  their  alterity,  
is   precisely   that   which   we   cannot   “murder”   or   appropriate.   The   untranslatable,   is   that   which  
remains.  Remains  to  come  and  remains  to  come  back;  the  arrivant,  the  untranslatable,  is  always  a  
revenant.  
Conclusion  
Finally,   to   return   to  where  we   started  with  Ricœur   and   the  models   for   a   new  Europe,  
what  does   the  supplement  of  untranslatability  or   the   failure  of  appropriation  bring   to  Ricœur’s  
account?  It  seems  to  me  that  by  disrupting  models  of  integration  with  the  fact  of  failure  we  can  
introduce  an  ethical  discomfort  that  prevents  us  settling  into  a  kind  of  complacency.  I  wish  to  be  
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very   clear   that   I   am  not   claiming   that   this   complacency   is  what  Ricœur  posits.   In   fact   in  many  
senses  Ricœur  warns  against  this  complacency  precisely  in  his  insistence  that  translation  is  never  
finished   and   must   always   begin   again;   hence   the   desire   to   retranslate.   Furthermore,   Ricœur  
explicitly  links  justice  itself  to  the  need  to  mourn  the  perfect  translation.79  Nonetheless,  my  claim  
is   that   Ricœur’s   account   could   lead   to   this   complacency;   that   if   we   follow   these   models   of  
integration  we  might  think  that  we  will  reach  success  and  that  in  thinking  we  have  succeeded  to  
understand  the  other  –  in  their  language  or  their  narrative  or  even  in  their  suffering  –  we  might  
stop  trying  to  understand  future  others.  My  claim  is  that  today,  as  Europe  faces  yet  another  series  
of   crises,   it   must   not   fall   into   the   easy   position   of   welcoming   what   is   other   only   for   its   own  
enrichment.  Rather,  Europe  must  remain  vigilant  to  its  own  unavoidable  failures.  If  the  model  of  
translation  offers  us  something  in  terms  of  re-­‐‑conceiving  European  institutions,  it  must  be  on  the  
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